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ARGUMENT
POINT I

A.

AN APPELLATE COURT MUST VIEW THE FACTS MOST
FAVORABLY TO PLAINTIFF SACHS AS THE PARTY OPPOSING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THUS, DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON PLAINTIFF
SACHS' CLAIMS, BASED ON DEFENDANTS' ALTERNATIVE
VERSION OF THE FACTS, MUST BE REJECTED.

Genuinely Disputed Issues Of Material Fact Remain For Trial On Plaintiff
Sachs' Claims Against Defendants For Declaratory Judgment And Breach Of
Express Or Implied Contract.
Defendants Lesser and Loeb and IJPCM dispute virtu.i III all the material factual

allegations in Plaintiff Sachs' "Statement of Facts" (Aplnt. Br. 4-15). Lesser and Loeb
begin their "Statement of the Case" by asserting that, "Sachs tried to interject himself into
the sale of UPCM", L&L Br. I,1 disputing Plaintiff Sachs' evidence that it was Lesser,
acting on behalf of Loeb and UPCM, who telephoned Sachs on May 17, 2001, and
requested Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible after receiving
written notice of the fee Sachs would expect for his services earlier that day. See, Sachs'
"Statement of Fact", U1J16-22, A P l n t -

Br

-

10 12

" .

Lesser and Loeb also baldly assert that, "Sachs... now seeks in excess of two
million dollars for making a few phone calls in which he did nothing more than tell
Gerald Jackson...something that Jackson and everyone else who follows real estate in
Park City, already knew," L&L Br. 1-2. This assertion disputes Plaintiff Sachs' evidence
(1) that Sachs' fee for finding a buyer for UPCM was based on the size of the deal and

Lesser's and Loeb's brief is referred to as "L&L Br." and UPCM s brief is referred
to as "UPCM Br." Lesser and Loeb and UPCM are sometimes collectively referred
herein as "Defendants." Appellant's opening brief is referred to as "Aplnt. Br."

the result achieved; (2) that the information Sachs conveyed to Jackson concerning
Lesser's desire for an immediate sale of UPCM because Lesser and Loeb had lost
confidence in RothwelPs ability to manage UPCM, as imparted to Sachs by Lesser in
their meeting on May 2, 2001, was not known to Jackson or anyone else at the time Sachs
initially contacted Jackson to purchase UPCM; (3) that, in addition to soliciting Jackson
to purchase UPCM, Sachs advised Jackson to obtain a confidentiality agreement from
UPCM to facilitate his purchase of UPCM, and that (4) pursuant to Lesser5 s instructions
to refer "any prospective purchasers" to UPCM President Rothwell, Sachs telephoned
Rothwell and advised him that Jackson was interested in purchasing UPCM based on
Sachs' solicitation. See, Sachs' "Statement of Facts", ffl| 17-18; 23-37, Aplnt. Br. 13-17.
Instead of citing record evidence to show that one or more of the facts alleged by
Plaintiff Sachs is incorrect or unsupported, Lesser, Loeb and UPCM dispute Plaintiff
Sachs' factual assertions by entirely supplanting Plaintiffs "Statement of Facts " with
their own, Lesser's and Loeb's consuming 59 paragraphs and UPCM's consuming 46
paragraphs. See, L&L Br. 4-17; UPCM Br. 4-13.2 Defendants list facts which are
immaterial to Plaintiffs1 claims and strategically omit many of the critical facts on which
Plaintiff Sachs' claims are predicated, without explicitly admitting or disputing such
facts, to give the appearance that the facts on which the district court granted summary

2

Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the brief of the
appellee need not contain a statement of the case, which includes a "statement of the facts
of the case relevant to the issues presented for review" required under Rule 24(a), "unless
the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant."

2

judgment are "undisputed" when, in fact, they are directly disputed by Defendants. (See,
L&L Br. 38-44; UPCM Br. 14, 33-46) For example, Plaintiff Sachs asserts that Lesser,
on behalf of Loeb and I JPCM, telephoned him on May 1 7, 2001, ai id i eqi lested Sach
find a buyer for UPCM as quickly as possible, after Lesser had received notice of the fee
Plaintiff Sachs expected for his services in a letter earlier that day. See, Sachs'
"Statement of Facts",fflf19-21, Aplnt. Br. 11-12. However, Lesser and Loeb and UPCM
fail to even mention this critical event. See, "Statement of Facts", ^ 33-35, L&L Br. 911; "Statement of Facts", 1J1123-25, UPCM. Br. 7-8.
Based on their own versions of the facts, Lesser and Loeb and UPCM argue that
the district court "correctly determined that no genuinely disputed issues of fact remain
for trial on Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and for breach of express and
implied contract" and that Defendants are entitled to judgment on these claims as a matter
of law. Compare, Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 25-33 with Argument, Point 111, I ,&L
Br. 38-43 and Argument, Point V, UPCM Br. 38-45.
1.

Breach of Express Contract

As to Plaintiff Sachs' claim for breach of express contract, Defendants argue that
there was "no meeting of the minds" on the terms of the contract, L&L Br. 18; UPCM Br.
39, and that, "Sachs admits that defendants did not assent either verbally or in writing to
the finder's fee stated in Sachs' letter." L&L Br. 38; UP< M i1

U

1 lefendants fail to

acknowledge that Sachs disputed this assertion with (1) Lesser's deposition testimony in
which Lesser agreed that Sachs would have been entitled to a finder's fee if he had found
Granite or Jackson to purchase UPCM, but denied that Sachs found Jackson to purchase
3

UPCM,3 and (2) Rothwell's fax to Sachs of August 19, 2003, long after the merger,
claiming that he and Jackson "had discussed UP for years" and "We viewed you as a
representative of Granite Construction only." See, "Statement of Facts", ^}43, Aplnt. Br.
18; Lesser Dep., Add. 9, R. 1411-1412; 1J49, Aplnt Br. 20 and Aplnt. Add. 10, R. 1452.
Defendants also fail to mention that Plaintiff Sachs presented sworn testimony that
Lesser verbally assented to the fee agreement by requesting Plaintiff Sachs to find a
purchaser for UPCM on May 17, 2001, after having received written notice of the fee
Plaintiff Sachs would expect for his services. See, "Statement of Facts", ffl| 11-22, Aplnt.
Br. 8-13; Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-31.
Plaintiff Sachs also presented sworn testimony that while he and Lesser did not
discuss the specific amount of a finder's fee Plaintiff Sachs would receive during their
meeting on May 2, 2001, they had a mutual understanding that Plaintiff Sachs would be
paid a reasonable and customary fee for his services as indicated by Lesser's comment to
Sachs during this meeting, that if DRKW, an investment banking firm that was working
with UPCM, located a purchaser for UPCM, Sachs would not receive the fee. See,
"Statement of Facts", lfl| 11-12, 14, Aplnt. Br. 8-10.
Plaintiff Sachs also presented evidence that Lesser and Rothwell acquiesced and
ratified the finder fee agreement by failing to repudiate the agreement despite numerous
opportunities to do so, including Lesser's conversation with Sachs on May 17, 2001, and
the subsequent occasion on which Plaintiff Sachs telephoned Rothwell to tell him that
3

Defendants also omit any reference to the substantial evidence Plaintiff Sachs
presented to dispute Lesser's and UPCM's assertion that Plaintiff Sachs did not locate
Jackson to purchase UPCM. See, "Statement of Facts",ffif23-40, 47, Aplnt. Br. 13-20.
4

Jackson was interested in purchasing UPCM based on Sachs' solicitation. See,
"Statement of Facts",fflf19-22, 28, 50-51, Aplnt. Br. 12-13, 15, 20-21. Plaintiff Sachs
also presented evidence that

ly received fees from UPC

f

o an

oral agreement, establishing a course of conduct between the parties. See, "Statement of
Facts", f2, Aplnt. Br. 6.4
Defendants next argue that, "Sachs' letters only discuss Granite." L&L Br. 38, 40;
UPCM Br. 35. Again, Defendants fail to mention that Sachs disputed this assertion with
his letter of May 18, 2001 to Rothwell and Lesser indicating that, "another investor
together with Granite, would make an excellent purchaser" and concluding that, "I will
continue to keep you apprised ol nil phipmuls wkeiln i fin suit* m (oiiit venturing of the
project", clearly indicating that Sachs is not limiting potential purchasers of UPCM to
Granite. (Emphasis Supplied) See, "Statement of Facts", 1fl[ 22, Aplnt. Br. 13.
Defendants also fail to mention Plaintiff Sachs' evidence that prior to delivering
his letters of May 17-18, 2001 to Rothwell and Lesser, Lesser had exhorted Sachs in their
initial meeting on May 2, 2001, to find a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM, and "to
get the job done, whether it's with Granite, or someone else, or a combination", and that
Lesser directed Sachs to refer "any prospective purchasers" to Rothwell, indicating that
the identity of the purchaser of UPCM was immaterial to Lesser; that Lesser encouraged
Plaintiff Sachs to find purchasers other than Granite, and that Lesser was thus well aware
Contrary to UPCM's assertion that "Plaintiff Sachs has never received a finder's fee
for the sale of a company," See, Statement of Facts, ^|46, UPCM Br. 12, Sachs testified
that he could not recall all of the instances in which he had received such fees due to the
passage of time and gave some examples of recent fees. See, Sachs Dep. 20:8-21:16, R.
748.
5

that Sachs was looking for potential purchasers for UPCM other than Granite. See,
"Statement of Facts",fflf19, Aplnt. Br. 11-12.
Additionally, Plaintiff Sachs provided sworn testimony that Lesser did not exclude
Jackson or anyone else that Sachs might contact as a potential purchaser for UPCM in
their meeting on May 2, 2001, except to say that if DRKW, the investment banking firm
working with UPCM found the purchaser, that Sachs would not receive the fee. Thus,
Lesser clearly left the field of potential purchasers Sachs might contact wide open. See,
"Statement of Facts", Tf^f 11-14, Aplnt. Br. 8-10.
Lesser and Loeb also argue that, "Lesser did not tell Sachs to go and find another
buyer or that Sachs would be paid a finder's fee", L&L Br. 39, again failing to mention
that Plaintiff Sachs disputes this assertion with sworn testimony and documentary
evidence that Lesser telephoned him on May 17, 2001, and told Sachs that he wanted him
to find a purchaser, rather than a joint venturer, for UPCM, and that this conversation
occurred after Lesser had received Sachs' letter earlier on May 17, 2001, indicating the
fees Sachs expected for his services. See, Lesser's phone records for May 17, 2001, R.
1561; "Statement of Facts",ffi[16-21, Aplnt. Br. 10-12.
Lesser's and Loeb's further argument that Sachs' statement in the letter of May
17, 2001, that he would accept a couple of prime developed lots in UPCM's Project
which were together valued at approximately $2 million dollars and that this amount is
approximately 3% of UPCM's purchase price "is nothing other than speculation and
conjecture", L& L Br. 39; UPCM Br. 39-40, is itself unsupported and contrary to Sachs'
evidence. Lesser and Loeb fail to cite record evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff Sachs
6

ever claimed that he knew the precise purchase price that would eventually be paid for
UPCM at the time he proposed the lots, valued at approximately $2 million, as a fee for
his services in locating a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM. Conversely, Plaintiff
Sachs presented sworn testimony that he arrived at the fee "based on his experience and
the size of the deal" and the fact that the fee amounted to approximately 3% of the total
price finally paid for UPCM further demonstrated that such a fee was reasonable. See,
"Statement of Facts", 1fl7, 42, Aplnt. Br. 11,18.
Plaintiff Sachs also presented evidence that despite his express request to Lesser
and Rothwell in his letter of May 17, 2001, to "please let me know if you have any
question about such a finder's fee," neither Lesser nor Rothwell ever questioned the
terms of the finder's fee agreement despite numerous opportunities to do so, thus
indicating that Lesser and Rothwell understood and accepted the terms of the finder fee
agreement. See, "Statement of Facts", 1ffl 19-21, 28, 50-51, Aplnt. Br. 15, 20-21.
2.

Breach of Implied Contract

As to Plaintiff Sachs' breach of implied contract claim, Defendants argue that,
"Sachs did not confer any benefit on Defendants' because "at the time of his initial
telephone conversation with Sachs, it is undisputed that Jackson already knew UPCM
was for sale and was working on the purchase" and that "Sachs did not find Jackson."
(Emphasis supplied). See, L&L Br. 41; UPCM Br. 45-46. Defendants fail to mention that
Plaintiff Sachs directly disputed this assertion with sworn testimony that he contacted
Jackson to purchase UPCM and told Jackson of Lesser's desire for an immediate sale of
UPCM because of Lesser's and Loeb's loss of confidence in Rothwell. Sachs testified
7

that during this initial contact, Jackson did not indicate that he was already in a deal with
Rothwell to purchase UPCM, but expressed immediate enthusiasm for purchasing UPCM
based on this new information, thanking Sachs and telling him that he would "like to take
the deal down with some institutional and other investors." See, "Statement of Facts", fflf
23-24, Aplnt. Br. 13-14. Defendants also fail to note that Sachs disputed their assertion
that Sachs did not confer a benefit on Defendants with Jackson's sworn testimony
admitting that Jackson did not sign a confidentiality agreement with UPCM, speak to
Lesser about purchasing UPCM, or form CGP to purchase UPCM until after Plaintiff
Sachs contacted him to purchase UPCM, and that Jackson never told Plaintiff Sachs that
he was already involved in a deal with Rothwell to purchase UPCM. See, Id., ^32-37,
55-56, Aplnt. Br. 16-17,21-22.
Lesser and Loeb also argue that, "it is undisputed that defendants neither knew or
should have known that Sachs expected to receive a fee as a consequence of Jackson's or
CGP's purchase of UPCM, because by Sachs' own admission, the only purchaser about
which defendants and Sachs had any discussions with Granite." (Emphasis supplied)
L&L Br. 41; UPCM Br. 46. However, Defendants fail to mention that Sachs presented
the record evidence disputing the foregoing assertions discussed above. See, "Statement
of Facts", tH H-22, 28, 43, Aplnt. Br. 8-10, 11-13, 15, 18.
Lesser & Loeb further assert that, "Sachs had no further communications with
defendants regarding a finder's fee between May 17, 2001, and the time of CGP's
purchase of UPCM." See L&L Br. 42. Again, Defendants fail to observe that Sachs
disputed this assertion with evidence showing that on May 18, 2001, he wrote Rothwell
8

and Lesser a letter, acknowledging Lesser's preference for a purchaser rather than a joint
venture partner, and stating that "another investor" with Granite might purchase UPCM,
and that he would keep them advised of "all proposals whether for sale or for a joint
venturing of the project", indicating that Sachs was not limiting potential purchasers to
Granite. Plaintiff also presented evidence that immediately following his initial contact
with Jackson, Sachs telephoned UPCM President Rothwell and informed him of
Jackson's interest in purchasing UPCM based on Sachs' solicitation. See, "Statement of
Facts", f22, 27-28, Aplnt. Br. 12-15.
Finally, Defendants assertion that, "Sachs was, at most, an officious intermeddler
in the transaction between CCP and UPCM" and that "it would be unjust for him to
recover a multi-million dollar fee for alleged work that conferred no benefit on
defendants and about which they were completely unaware", L&L Br. 43-44, is simply a
self-serving adhominem attack on Plaintiff Sachs. This assertion is disputed by Plaintiff
Sachs' evidence that on May 2, 2001, Lesser requested Sachs to find him a purchaser or
joint venturer for UPCM and to "get the job done, whether it was with Granite, or
someone else, or a combination", and then later on May 17, 2001, after receiving written
notice of the fees Plaintiff Sachs would charge for his services, that Lesser telephoned
Sachs and asked him to find a purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible.
Plaintiff Sachs' evidence also shows that he found Jackson as a purchaser for
UPCM, notified Rothwell that he had done so in accordance with Lesser's instruction,
and that, as the result, Jackson created CGP which purchased the stock of UPCM for
$67.2 million, conferring a substantial benefit on Lesser, Loeb and UPCM, and that
9

Lesser and Rothwell both agreed that Sachs would have been entitled to a finder's fee for
locating Granite or Jackson to purchase UPCM, but denied that Sachs found Jackson.
See, "Statement of Facts",ffif11- 44, Aplnt. Br. 8-19, Add. 10, R. 1452.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' tactic of ignoring the genuinely disputed
issues of material fact remaining for trial on Plaintiff Sachs' claims must be rejected. In
reviewing a grant of summary judgment by the lower court, the appellate court accords
no deference to the district court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute, or the
court's legal conclusions based on those facts. Additionally, an appellate court views the
facts, including all inferences arising from those facts, in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion and allows the summary judgment to stand only if Ihe movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. See, Republic Group,
Inc. v. Won-door Corporation, 883 P.2d 285, 288-289 (Utah App. 1994); Sycamore
Family, L.L.C.; and Leland Sycamore v. Vintage et al, 2006 UT App 387, ^2.
Here, as in the district court, Plaintiff Sachs presents record evidence supporting
each individual element of his claims for declaratory judgment and for breach of express
and implied contract, from which a reasonable jury could find that the Lesser, on behalf
of Loeb and UPCM, requested Plaintiff Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM after
receiving written notice of the fee Plaintiff Sachs expected for his services. See,
"Statement of Facts", Aplnt Br. 5-22, and Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-36.
Plaintiff Sachs also presented substantial case law holding that an express or
implied contract arises under facts similar to those presented by Plaintiff Sachs, wherein
one party to a contract manifests assent to a contract by requesting the performance of a
10

service after receiving notice of the fee the other party is expecting for the services. See,
Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-36. This Court's recent decision in Alpha Partners, Inc.
v. Transamerica Investment Management LLC, 2006 UT App. 331, also supports
Plaintiff Sachs' argument that the district court erred in finding that the terms of the
parties' contract were too indefinite to be enforced, because there was extrinsic evidence
from which the terms could have been determined, and because a term of "reasonable
compensation" may be implied in a contract. See, Id. at ^|24, citing Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, §204 (1981) and Coulter & Smith , Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah
1998) (stating as settled law

Wooldridge v. Wareing, 120 Utah 514, 236 P.2d 341,

342 (1951) (reading implied term of reasonable compensation into an implied in fact
service contract.); See also, Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 26-36.
Because genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for trial on Plaintiff
Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and breach of express or implied contract and
Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court should rule that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants on these claims and
remand the case for a trial on the merits.
POINT II

A.

THE PLAIN WORDS OF UREBA DO NOT PROHIBIT AN
INDIVIDUAL FROM RECEIVING A FEE FOR FINDING A
BUYER FOR THE STOCK OF A PUBLICLY HELD
CORPORATION. THUS, THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THE GROUND THAT
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED UNDER UREBA.

UREBA Is A Penal Statute.
Defendants' argument that the Utah Real Estate Broker's Act ("UREBA"), Aplnt.
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Br. Add. 4, is not a penal statute based on cases from other jurisdictions involving
different subject matters, L& L Br. 24-27, UPCM Br. 19-23, is incorrect. Defendants cite
no Utah case to support this argument and Utah courts have traditionally considered Utah
criminal and civil statutes imposing substantial monetary and criminal penalties to be
penal in nature. See, Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management Inc.,
2006 UT 45, H1I 10-12, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, (Utah Forcible Detainer statute); State of
Utah v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49,1fl| 17-19 (Utah Controlled Substances Act); I.M.L. v. State
of Utah, 2002 UT 110,1J21, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah criminal libel statute); Jack B. Parsons
Companies v. Nield et aL 751 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah 1988) (Utah statute providing
double damages for wrongful failure to discharge or release mortgage); Shibata v. Bear
River State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 25 I, 254 (Utah 1949) (Utah statute providing
double damages for wrongful failure to discharge or release mortgage).
B.

As A Penal Statute, UREBA Should Be Construed According To The Fair
Import Of Its Provisions To Promote Justice And Effect The Objects Of Law
And The General Purposes Outlined In §76-1-104,
Lesser, Loeb and UPCM argue that the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of

UREBA, incorporating the phrase "leaseholds and business opportunities involving real
property", "reflects the legislature's intention that the real estate licensing provisions be
given broad application." L&L. Br. 20-21, UPCM Br. 19-23. However, Utah rules of
statutory interpretation do not require either a "broad" or "strict" interpretation of the
words of a penal statute per se. While the determination of whether a real estate broker's
licensing statute is, or is not a "penal statute" is significant in jurisdictions whose laws
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expressly require penal statutes to be strictly construed, Utah law jettisons the rule.
Section 76-1-106 provides that:
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply
to the provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, or any other offense
defined by the laws of this state. All provisions of this code and
offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be construed
according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and
effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of Section 761-104.
See, State v. Christensen, 2001 UT 14, ^[3, 20 P.3d 329, quoting Utah Code Ann. §76-1106. (Emphasis supplied) Section 76-1-104 identifies the general purposes of the laws
of the State of Utah:
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of the offenses,
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which
constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is without
fault from condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness
of the offenses and which permit recognition or differences in
rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders, and
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused
or convicted of offenses.
(Emphasis supplied)
Because UREBA prescribes criminal penalties for the violation of its licensing
provisions under §61-2-17, including fines and imprisonment, the Court should strictly
interpret UREBA according to its plain words to prevent the criminalization of innocent
conduct not specifically prohibited under UREBA, consistent with the requirements for
federal and state constitutional due process notice and the purposes of §76-1-104(2). See,
Argument, Point IIA, Aplnt. Br. 36-29. See also, State of Utah v. Moonev, 2004 UT 49,
H17.
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C.

The Terms "Business" And "Business Opportunity Involving Real Property"
Incorporated In The Definition of "Real Estate" in UREBA Are Undefined
And Would Not Commonly Be Understood As Encompassing An Agreement
To Pay An Individual A Fee For Locating A Buyer For The Stock Of A
Publicly Held Corporation.
In Peterson v. Sunrider, 2002 UT 43, ^[27, 48 P.3d 918, the Utah Supreme Court

held that the determination of whether a contract is illegal or unenforceable based on a
penal statute requires thee steps. The court must determine: (1) what the terms of the
contract are; (2) what the statute prohibits; and (3) whether the statute or public policy
demands that the contract be deemed unenforceable. In determining whether UREBA
prohibits the enforcement of an agreement to pay an individual a fee for finding a buyer
for the stock of a publicly held corporation, "the words of a statute should be interpreted
in accord with their usual and accepted meaning''

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort 808

P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). (Emphasis supplied)
Even employing a "broad interpretation" of UREBA advocated by Defendants,
L&L Br. 24-26 and UPCM Br. 19-25, the "usual and accepted meaning" of the phrase
"business opportunities involving real property" used to define the term "real estate" in
§61-2-2(14), would not be understood as relating to finding a buyer for the stock of a
publicly traded corporation in exchange for a fee, particularly where the terms "business"
and "business opportunities" used in §61-2-2(14), are not defined in UREBA.
Although Defendants quote Chase v. Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1959) (cited
in both Defendants' briefs as Chade v. Morgan), as support for their argument that the
definition of "real estate" in UREBA requires a "broad cover coverage be given to the
term 'real estate' for the purposes of the Act," See, L&L Br. 20; UPCM Br. 16, the quote
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is taken out of context. In Chase, the Utah Supreme Court actually stated that:
Appellant's third contention that oil and gas leases are not 'real
estate' because they were ordinarily estates for years and under the
common law were classified as chattels real and considered personal
property might have been persuasive were it not for the fact that
[continuing with language quoted by Lesser, Loeb and UPCM, L&L
Br. 25; UPCM Br. 16] the legislature saw fit to include within the
definition of the term 'real estate9 leaseholds and other interests
less than leaseholds. This clearly indicates the intention of the
legislature that a broad coverage be given to the term 'real estate' for
the purposes of the Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Chase, the Utah Supreme Court indicates that had the Utah Legislature
not expressly included the terms "leasehold and other interests less than leaseholds" in
the definition of "real estate", the Court would likely not have interpreted the term "real
estate" in UREBA as including oil and gas leases. Id. at 1020. Similarly, in the instant
case, the Court should decline to interpret the phrase "business opportunity involving real
property" used to define the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA to include
finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation, where the terms "business",
"business opportunity involving real property" are undefined and would not be
commonly understood as encompassing stock transactions. See, LM.L. v. State of Utah,
2002 UT 110, Tfl2, ("[We] will not 'infer substantive terms into the text that are not
already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and [we
have 'no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.'")
(internal citations omitted)5

Plaintiff Sachs does not dispute that one must be licensed as a real estate broker to
receive a fee for finding a buyer for the real property assets of a corporation. See,
Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc.. 584 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah
15

D.

Had The Utah Legislature Decided To Abolish The Historic Distinction
Between Stock As Personal Property And Corporate Real Estate As Real
Property In UREBA, It Would Have Done So Expressly.
UREBA is limited to transactions involving real estate. Defendants wholly fail to

counter Plaintiff Sachs' argument that if the Utah Legislature had intended to include the
sale of a corporation's stock in the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14), it would
have expressly declared this intention, because the term "real estate" would not be
generally understood as including the stock of a corporation. (Emphasis supplied). See,
Argument, Point IIB, Aplnt. Br. 39-40. Instead, Defendants cite cases involving real
estate assets rather than the purchase of the stock of a publicly held corporation at issue
here. Defendants also cite cases from other jurisdictions whose laws define the terms
"real estate", "business", or "business opportunity", to include the sale of the stock of a
1978), cited L&L Br. 19. However, Plaintiff Sachs contends that the term "real estate" in
UREBA does not encompass an agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a publicly held
corporation, as opposed to its real property assets. Diversified did not involve the
purchase of the stock of the corporation as in the instant case. Id. at 849.
6

The following cases involve the sale of real property and/or lease assets: Andalex
Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994) (coal leases); Blackthorne Group v.
Pines of Newmarket 848 A.2d 725, 727-728 (N.H. 2004) (Asset sale of assisted living
facility); Chapin v. Neuhoff, 684 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Neb. 2004) (Sale of a radio station
and lease); GDC Environmental Services, Inc. v. Ransbottom Landfill 740 N.E.2d 1254,
1256 (Ind. App. 2000) (Asset sale of a landfill); Lockridge v. Hale, 764 S.W.2d 84, 85
(Ky. App. 1989) (Asset sale of a horse farm); Ford v. American Medical International,
422 N.W.2d 67, 68-69 (Neb. 1988) (Sale of a hospital which held a lease); Knight v.
Johnson, 741 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Mo. App. 1987) (Sale of car wash business contingent on
assumption of a lease); Berchenko v. Fulton 261 S.E.2d 643, 644 (Ga. 1979) (sale of
mobile home park); Thomas v. Jarvis, 518 P.2d 532, 533-534 (Kan. 1974) (Asset sale of
corporation); Bonasera v. Roffe, 442 P.2d 165, 165 (Ariz. App. 1968) (Sale of a tavern
business and a lease); Doran v. Imeson Aviation 419 F. Supp 586, 587 (D.C. Wyo. 1976)
(Sale of airport service business and leases); Folsom v. Callen, 131 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind.
App. 1956) (Sale of a hotel business and its lease); Thomas v. Daubs, 684 N.E.2d 1011,
1012 (111. App. 1997) (Asset sale of a landfill).
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corporation where the corporation has any interest in real estate, or an interest in real
estate that is deemed to be more than incidental. See, L&L Br. 20-23; UPCM Br. 16-18.7
However, the provisions of the statutes considered in these cases are different from the
provisions of UREBA. Finally, Defendants cite Shortt v. Knob City Investment Co., Inc.,
292 S.E.2d 737 738-740 (N.C. 1982). See, L&L Br. 28, n.9. There, a real estate broker
sued for his commission on the sale of real estate listed by him pursuant to an exclusive
written listing agreement with the defendant corporation. The defendant refused to pay
the commission because, instead of conveying the real estate to the purchaser, the
company's four shareholders conveyed 100% of their stock to the purchaser, which the
corporation contended was not the sale of real estate. This case is inapplicable here
because Plaintiff Sachs was not a real estate broker and did not offer or agree to find or
o

list any real estate of UPCM in return for a finder's fee.

Thus, none of the case law

cited by Defendants compels this Court to interpret the terms "business" or "business
opportunities involving real property" used to define "real estate" under §61-2-2(14) of
UREBA, to include finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation.

The following cases involve stock transactions under state statutes interpreted as
requiring licensing for stock transactions involving sale of business owning real estate:
Leiffv.Medco. 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. App. 1998) (Colorado REBA); Brakhage v.
Georgetown Associates, 523 P.2d 145, 147 (Colo. App. 1974) (Colorado REBA); March
Group v. Bellar. 908 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. App. 1995) (Tenn. REBA); Everett v.
Goodloe, 602 S.E.2d 284, 286-287 (Ga. App.2004) (Georgia REBA); Coonev v. Ritter,
939 F.2d 81, 88, (3rd Circ, 1991) (New Jersey REBA); All Points Traders v. Barrington
Associates 259 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782-786 (Cal. App. 1989) (California REBA).
8

See, "Statement of Facts", \\ 11-22, Aplnt. Br. 8-13.
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The fact that Utah jurisprudence regards the distinction between the sale of a
corporation's assets (including its real estate) versus the sale of a corporation's stock as
fundamental and not incidental, also weighs against such an interpretation. For example,
in Decius v. Action Collections, 2004 UT App. 484, 105 P.3d 956, this Court recently
reaffirmed that transfers of corporate assets and corporate stock are fundamentally
different, such that for purposes of corporate "successor liability" in Utah, the purchaser
of a corporation's assets generally does not acquire the liabilities of the corporation,
whereas a purchaser of the corporation's stock in a merger, as occurred in this case, does
acquire its liabilities. Id. at 958-959.
Similarly, in Bertha v. Remy Int'l 414 F.Supp.2d 869 (E.D. Wis., 2006) the
federal district court, applying Wisconsin law, recently denied a motion to dismiss an
action by an individual seeking to enforce a fee contract for finding a buyer for a business
in a stock sale transaction, because the Wisconsin Real Estate Broker's Act, like UREBA,
did not define the term "business", and the district court did not believe that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court would disregard the distinction between the sale of a
corporation's real estate assets and the sale of its stock given its historical adherence to
the distinction. Id. at 880-881. See also, 17 Williston on Contracts, §51:2 (4th ed. 2006),
Aplnt. Br. Add. 6; Cruising World v. Westermeyer, 351 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla. App. 1977).
Based on the foregoing, the Court should decline the invitation of Lesser, Loeb
and UPCM to broadly interpret the terms "business" and "business opportunity involving
real estate" in UREBA to encompass the an agreement to pay an individual a fee for
locating a purchaser for the stock of a publicly held corporation.
18

E.

UREBA Should Be Interpreted To Avoid Criminalizing Conduct Not Plainly
Prohibited Under Its Provisions.
The statutory interpretation of UREBA is circumscribed by the plain language of

the statute, legislative intent and the requirements of due process. "[Due process]
guarantees do not permit enforcement of a penal statute that forbids an act in terms so
vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's
meaning and differ as to its application." State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, ^[17. See also,
Argument, Point IIA, Aplnt. Br. 36-39.
As previously noted, the terms "business" and "business opportunity" are not
currently defined in §61-2-2 of UREBA, and were not defined in UREBA in 2001 when
the events in this case occurred. In 1985, the Utah Legislature repealedthe definition of
"business opportunity" then contained in §61-2-2(5) of UREBA as, "an existing business,
a business and its good will, a business franchise, or any combination of them." Aplnt.
Br. Add. 7 at 19. This legislative action belies Defendants' argument that the Utah
Legislature intended to include finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held
corporation within the ambit of the phrase "business opportunities involving real
property" used to define the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA. L&L Br. 2430;UPCMBr. 19-25.
The only definition of "business opportunity" contained in Utah statutes in 2001,
or currently, is found in the Utah Business Opportunity Act, §13-15-2(2), which defines
"business opportunity" as "an assisted marketing plan subject to this chapter." See, Aplnt.
Add. 8 (attached). Thus, in 2001, there was simply nothing in the definition of "real
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estate" contained in §61-2-2(14), or any other provision of UREBA, that would have
given due process notice to citizens of common intelligence, including Plaintiff Sachs,
that an individual was required to be licensed as a real estate broker in order to obtain a
fee for finding a buyer for the stock of UPCM, a publicly held company.9
Defendants' argument that because Sachs is not being criminally prosecuted or
fined for violating the act, that UREBA is not penal, L&L Br. at 25, UPCM Br. 19, is the
proverbial "tail wagging the dog." That Plaintiff Sachs is not currently being criminally
prosecuted under UREBA does not mean that Plaintiff Sachs is not being punished under
the statute. To the contrary, the fact that he is not licensed as a real estate broker under
UREBA is being used to deny him a substantial fee for locating a buyer for UPCM.
Moreover, were this Court to retroactively interpret UREBA as requiring Plaintiff
Sachs to have been licensed as a real estate broker in order to find a buyer for the stock of
UPCM, a publicly held corporation, Plaintiff Sachs would be subject to the criminal
penalties under §61-2-17 of UREBA even though a person of common intelligence would
not have been able to discern from the plain language of UREBA that such a transaction
required a real estate broker's license. "The ambiguity in the statute is such that the scope
of its ... prohibition cannot be decisively interpreted by lawyers, to say nothing of

9

Lesser's and Loeb's reliance on Springer v. Rosauer, 641 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1982) for its argument that even under a "strict construction" Sachs was
required to be licensed, See L&L Br., is unwarranted. That case involved the construction
of a Washington statute that expressly defined the term "business opportunity" to mean
and include "business, business opportunity and good will of an existing business or any
one or a combination thereof," whereas UREBA does not define this term, and in 1985,
the Utah Legislature repealed the definition of "business opportunity" similar to that
contained in the Washington statute in Springer.
20

citizens untrained in law. This weighs strongly against any interpretation that would
enable to state to initiate criminal prosecution based on arguably legitimate conduct."
State of Utah v. Mooney, supra, at ^|18. Defendants cannot surmount the due process
implications of the ambiguous language of UREBA by arguing that there is no express
exemption for finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation in UREBA.
See, L&L Br. 27; UPCM Br. 24. Barbers and shipbuilding are not exempted under
UREBA but also are clearly not covered under the plain words of the Act.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should decline Defendants' invitation to
interpret UREBA to criminalize conduct not plainly prohibited under its provisions and
hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants on
Plaintiff Sachs' claims on the ground that such claims were barred under UREBA.
POINT III

NEITHER UREBA NOR PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT
DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT TO PAY PLAINTIFF SACHS A FEE
FOR FINDING A BUYER FOR THE STOCK OF UPCM BE
DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE. THUS, THE COURT SHOULD
HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THE GROUND
THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY UREBA.

Plaintiff Sachs does not dispute that in addition to punishing individuals who
violate its licensing provisions, a primary purpose of UREBA is "to protect members of
the public who rely on licensed real estate brokers and salesmen to perform tasks that
require a high degree of honesty and integrity", See L&L Br. 24; UPCM Br. 19-23.
However, this regulatory purpose does not preclude UREBA from being considered a
"penal statute" given the monetary and criminal penalties prescribed for the violation of
its licensing provisions in §61-2-17 of the Act, Aplnt. Br. Add. 4.
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The regulatory purpose of UREBA has also not deterred Utah courts from finding
the Act's licensing requirements inapplicable in cases where, as here, sophisticated
business brokers or real estate developers, including Lesser, Loeb and UPCM, whose
interests were not designed to be protected by UREBA, attempt to invoke UREBA as a
shield against the performance of their just contractual obligations. Thus, in Global
Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1980), cited
L&L Br. 24; UPCM Br. 21, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "The purpose of these
provisions is not to protect real estate developers who seek relief from their own
contractual obligations."10 In the instant case, Plaintiff Sachs presented record evidence
indicating that at the time he requested Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM, Lesser had
been a real estate broker and investor in New York for over 30 years, and UPCM's
President, Rothwell, had been a real estate broker, developer and investor in Utah for
over 30 years. An investment banking firm and numerous attorneys also represented
Contrary to Defendants' argument, L&L Br. 32-33, this Court's decision in
Andalex does not compel a different result. In Andalex, the plaintiff admitted his action
to recover a finder's fee for locating a buyer for the defendants' coal leases was barred
under the unambiguous language of UREBA requiring a real estate broker's license for
such transactions, but argued that the purpose of the statute was to protect the public and
not to protect "sophisticated corporate entities" and that this purpose should override the
literal terms of UREBA to permit his suit. This Court rejected the argument, holding that,
"If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will not look beyond the
language of the statute to make the language conform to a purpose not expressed." Id. at
1045. By contrast, in the instant case, the term "real estate" and the terms "business" and
"business opportunity involving real property" used to define the term "real estate" in
§61-2-2(14) of UREBA, do not literally or unambiguously prohibit plaintiff Sachs'
conduct in finding a purchaser for the stock of a publicly held corporation, as opposed to
the real property assets of a corporation, without a real estate broker's license. Under this
circumstance, resort to the purposes of UREBA is appropriate in determining whether
such conduct implicates the licensing requirements of the Act.
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Lesser, Loeb in the sale of UPCM's stock. Rothwell had personally known Sachs for 15
to 20 years as a business consultant who worked on a fee basis and UPCM had paid a fee
to Sachs in an earlier transaction. See, "Statement of Facts", ^ | 2, 5-6, 9, 54, Aplnt. Br. 78, 21. Thus, Defendants Lesser, Loeb and UPCM were themselves, or were represented
by, experienced and sophisticated real estate brokers and other business professionals in
the sale of UPCM and did not require the protection from unscrupulous real estate
brokers afforded to unsophisticated members of the public by the real estate broker
licensing requirements of UREBA in the transaction. Govert Copier Painting v. Van
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1990) ("When the contracting party possesses
knowledge and expertise in the field, it is not within the class of persons in need of the
protection that the licensing statute was intended to provide.")
Moreover, Defendants were not the victims of any substantive evil designed to be
prevented by the real estate broker licensing provisions of UREBA. See, Peterson v.
Sunrider, 2002 UT 43, Tf39, ("In considering the public policy regarding enforcement, the
court must consider whether holding the contract unenforceable is to the benefit or
detriment of the parties the statute is designed to protect. 6 A Arthur Linton Corbin,
Corbin On Contracts §1513.") Viewing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff Sachs,
Lesser, Loeb and UPCM got exactly what they wanted as the result of their agreement
with Sachs, namely a buyer to purchase UPCM for $67.2 million dollars, a substantial
benefit which Defendants readily accepted. Moreover, Lesser, Rothwell and Jackson
have a motive to falsify the nature of their dealings with Plaintiff Sachs to avoid the
payment of his finder's fee. See, "Statement of Facts",ffif1-39, 44, 55-56, Aplnt. Br. 523

17, 19, 21-22. Thus, the regulatory purpose of UREBA in no way requires that the
subject finder's fee agreement be deemed unenforceable.11
Furthermore, the public policy of Utah favors the enforcement of valid contracts
and has long invoked doctrines of equity, including equitable estoppel and acquiescence,
to prevent parties who have accepted the benefits of a contract from unjustly disaffirming
their contractual obligation to pay the party who conferred the benefit. "It has been
repeatedly held that a person by acceptance of the benefits may be estopped from
questioning the existence, validity and effect of a contract." Swan Creek Village
Homeowners Assn. v. Warner, 2006 UT 22,1J35, quoting Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co.,
289 P. 151, 154 (Utah 1930), and Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691
(Utah 1985) (listing the elements of equitable estoppel).
Here, the evidence viewed most favorably toward Plaintiff Sachs, shows that
Lesser, Loeb and UPCM received $67.2 million dollars for the purchase of UPCM's
stock as the direct result of Plaintiff Sachs' efforts in locating Jackson to purchase
UPCM. See, "Statement of Facts",ffif1- 44, Aplnt. Br. 5-19. Thus, Defendants should be

Even assuming arguendo that the parties' agreement did violate the regulatory
purpose of UREBA, which Plaintiff Sachs disputes, the fact that a contract serves a
prohibited statutory purpose does not necessarily make the contract unenforceable. See,
Peterson v. Sunrider, supra, ^39, quoting McCormick v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 308 P.2d
949, 951 (Utah 1957) ("Arbitrary refusal to grant relief under contracts merely in
violation of statute often brings about such incongruous results in giving advantages to
wrongdoers and penalizing the relatively innocent that the courts have carved out so
many exceptions to the so-called 'general rule5 that it can hardly be properly so
denominated"); See also, 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §1373 (1962).
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equitably estopped to assert UREBA as a defense to Plaintiff Sachs' contract claims for
payment of his fees.
The courts of this state have also found ratification of a contract "under
circumstances of acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not promptly exercised"
and "even though certain express formalities have not been met." Swan Creek, supra,
f34, citing Aggeller & Musser Seed Co. v. Blood, 272 P. 933, 937 (Utah 1928)
(indicating that "acceptance of services rendered with full knowledge of the contract
under which rendered is a ratification of such contract."); Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531
P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1974), ("delay in repudiation gives rise to an implied or de facto
ratification of [a] contract"), and Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453,
B.P.O.E., 56 P.2d 1046, 1047-48 (Utah 1974) ("Ratification may be implied by
acquiescence in, or recognition of, the act of the officers by the corporation or by acts
tending to show an acceptance or adoption of the contract.")
Again, the evidence viewed most favorably to Plaintiff Sachs shows that
Defendants ratified the subject finder's fee agreement, in that neither Lesser, on behalf of
Loeb and UPCM, nor Rothwell, on behalf of UPCM, ever told Sachs prior to Jackson's
purchase of UPCM, that they would not pay him the finder's fee outlined in his letter of
May 17, 2001. See, "Statement of Facts", Ht 16-20, 22, 28, Aplnt. Br. 10-13, 15.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should hold that there is nothing in the
purpose of UREBA or the public policy of the State of Utah requiring that Plaintiff
Sachs' finder fee agreement with Defendants be deemed unenforceable, and that the
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district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that
Plaintiffs' claims were barred under UREBA.
POINT IV

A.

THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT RENDER THE
DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT TO PAY PLAINTIFF SACHS A
FINDER'S FEE FOR LOCATING JACKSON TO PURCHASE THE
STOCK OF UPCM UNENFORCEABLE AND DEFENDANTS ARE
EQUITABLY ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE STATUTE AS A
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS. THUS, THIS COURT
SHOULD HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS BASED
ON ITS CONTRARY CONCLUSIONS.

Defendants Concede That The Plain Words Of The Utah Statute Of Frauds
Do Not Require That An Agreement To Pay An Individual A Fee For Finding
A Buyer For The Stock Of A Corporation Be In Writing To Be Enforceable.
By arguing that §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Statute of Frauds ["every agreement

authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation" (Emphasis supplied)], prohibits an agreement to pay an individual a fee
for finding a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation only when read "in pari
materia" with the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, See, L&L Br. 35;
UPCM Br. 27, n. 15, Defendants concede that the plain words of §25-5-4(5) of the Utah
Statute of Frauds do not require that such an agreement be in writing to be enforceable.
See, Argument, Point III, Aplnt. Br. 45-48, and Aplnt. Br. Add. 5.
Defendants "in pari materia" argument is also flawed because the term "real
estate" as defined in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, would not be commonly understood to
include the stock of a publicly held corporation. See, Argument, Point II, supra, at 12.
Thus, neither statute, alone or together, provides that a transaction involving the sale of
the stock of a publicly held corporation constitutes "real estate".
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Because §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Statute of Frauds does not require an agreement to
pay an individual a fee for locating a buyer for the stock of a publicly held corporation,
UPCM's argument that Plaintiff Sachs' letter to Defendants indicating the fee he would
charge for his services does not comply with the requirements for a writing under the
Utah Statute of Frauds, UPCM Br. 28-30, is irrelevant.
B.

Plaintiff Sachs' Full Performance Of The Finder's Fee Agreement Permits Its
Enforcement Takes The Agreement Out Of The Statute Of Frauds.
Lesser and Loeb's argument that "a real estate broker or agent cannot recover [a]

commission for services rendered in either selling or procuring a purchaser for real
property unless ... there is an express contract", and that in such case "performance or
part performance of a parol agreement is unavailing", (Emphasis supplied), See, L&L Br.
36 (citing cases), is inapplicable to this case because the record evidence viewed most
favorably to Plaintiff Sachs, demonstrates that Lesser, on behalf of Loeb and UPCM,
never requested Plaintiff Sachs to, and Plaintiff Sachs never agreed to, procure a
purchaser for the real property assets of UPCM, but only agreed to find a buyer for the
publicly traded stock of the corporation in exchange for the fee described in his letter of
May 17, 2001, to Rothwell and Lesser. (Emphasis supplied) See, "Statement of Facts",
1f1f 11, 13, 15, 19-22, 40, Aplnt. Br. 8-12, and Letter of May 17 2001, Aplnt. Br. Add. 2.
Lesser and Loeb's alternative argument that "even if the doctrine of part
performance was available, Sachs has failed to establish the requisite elements with
'strong* evidence," citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^24, 44 P.3d 742, L&L Br. 36-37,
is unavailing. The strong evidence referred to in Spears refers to the Court's preference
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for "acts-oriented" rather than "word-oriented" evidence consisting of acts of the plaintiff
that "must be exclusively referable to the contract... and reasonably explicable only on
the postulate that a contract exists." Id. |24. In Spears, the Utah Supreme Court also
explained that, "under certain circumstances the exclusively referable requirement may
be relaxed," and that, "The more conclusive the direct proof of the contract, the less
stringent the requirement of exclusively referable acts." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff Sachs presented abundant evidence that he fully performed his agreement
with Lesser, on behalf of Loeb and UPCM, to find a buyer for the stock of UPCM for a
reasonable and customary fee, and that Defendants received the benefit of $67.2 million
dollars as the result of Jackson's purchase of the stock of UPCM, the majority of which
was owned by Lesser and Loeb. Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable to
permit Defendants to raise the Utah Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiff Sachs'
claims. After all, the purpose of the Statute is to prevent frauds, not to permit defendants
to perpetrate a fraud on Plaintiff Sachs.

Plaintiff Sachs' evidence of acts exclusively referable to his finder's fee agreement
with Defendants, include Sachs' acts of: (1) contacting Jackson pursuant to Lesser's
request of May 17, 2001, that Sachs find a purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible,
after Lesser received written notice of the fees Sachs would charge for his services in
finding a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM earlier that day; (2) requesting Rothwell
and Lesser to contact him if they had any question about the finder's fee referred to in his
letter of May 17, 2001; (3) delivering another letter to Rothwell on May 18, 2001,
confirming Lesser's preference for a purchaser for UPCM and stating that he would keep
them informed of all prospective purchasers; (4) advising Jackson to contact Rothwell to
get a confidentiality agreement so that he could obtain information relevant to his
purchase of UPCM and to contact Sachs after Jackson had spoken to Rothwell pursuant
to Lesser's instruction to Sachs to refer all prospects to Rothwell; (5) contacting Rothwell
to advise him of Jackson's interest in purchasing UPCM as the result of the information
Sachs provided to Jackson; (6) advising Jackson that Granite, might be interested in
28

Although Lesser and Loeb attempt to argue that the foregoing acts are not
referable to the parties' contract, by asserting that, "Sachs never attended any meetings
between UPCM and Jackson, was never asked to sign a confidentiality agreement with
UPCM and never participated in any negotiations with UPCM", L&L Br. 37, Sachs did
not need to perform any of the foregoing acts to fulfill his agreement with Defendants to
locate a purchaser for UPCM, which he fully performed by locating Jackson as a
purchaser for UPCM, referring Jackson to Rothwell and advising Rothwell of Jackson's
interest in purchasing UPCM based on Sachs' solicitation. See, Id.
C.

Sachs' Acts Were In Reliance On The Contract.
Lesser and Loeb alternatively argue that, "Sachs' efforts were not done in reliance

on the alleged contract.. .but were in pursuit of a deal he was attempting to arrange for his
client Granite", L&L Br. 37. This argument is unsupported and disputes Plaintiff Sachs'
record evidence demonstrating that following Lesser's request May 17, 2001 request to
Sachs to find a buyer for UPCM as quickly as possible, Sachs contacted Jackson to
purchase UPCM, and that following his initial solicitation of Jackson, Sachs focused his
efforts on supporting Jackson's bid to purchase UPCM Sachs, based on the immediate

purchasing UPCM with Jackson; (7) calling Granite to see if Granite would be interested
in purchasing UPCM with Jackson; (8) refraining from contacting other parties to
purchase UPCM after Jackson thanked Sachs for the information he provided and
indicated to Sachs his interest in putting a deal together to purchase UPCM; (9)
contacting Jackson frequently thereafter to ascertain his progress in purchasing UPCM;
and (10) requesting the payment of his finder's fee from UPCM at the time Jackson
completed his purchase of UPCM. Sachs also presented evidence that Rothwell admitted
that Sachs would not have engaged in these acts merely as a "volunteer" without
expectation of payment. See, "Statement of Facts",fflf23-49, Aplnt. Br. 13-20.
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interest Jackson had expressed in purchasing UPCM in response to Sachs' solicitation,
and based on Sachs' belief that Jackson had the ability and resources to purchase UPCM,
such that Sachs would receive his finder's fee from Defendants. See, "Statement of
Facts", TfTf 29-46, Aplnt. Br. 15-19. Based upon the foregoing, the Court should rule that
the Utah Statute of Frauds does not apply to the parties' finder's fee agreement.
Alternatively, the Court should rule that genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain
for trial regarding (1) whether Plaintiff Sachs fully performed his obligations under the
parties' finder fee agreement, such that the agreement is taken outside of the Statute of
Frauds, and/or (2) whether Defendants are estopped to raise the Statute of Frauds as a
defense to Plaintiff Sachs' claims in this case. Thus, the Court should reverse the district
court's summary judgment for Defendants based on its incorrect conclusion that Plaintiff
Sachs' claims are barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment, breach of express or implied
contract are not barred under UREB A or the Utah Statute of Frauds, and the evidence
viewed most favorably to Plaintiff Sachs discloses that genuinely disputed issues of
material fact remain for trial on each of Plaintiff Sachs' claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff
Sachs respectfully requests that the Court reverse the contrary judgment of the district
court and remand this case for a trial on the merits.
DATED and respectfully submitted this 10th day of October 2006.
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INDEX TO APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ADDENDUM
These addenda are attached to Appellant's Opening Brief.
Utah Business Opportunity Disclosure Act, §13-15-1 et. seq.
Lesser Deposition Excerpts, R. 1411-1412
Fax from Rothwell to Sachs, dated August 19, 2003, R. 1452

Tab 8
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Page

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
-f Chapter 15. Business Opportunity Disclosure Act
§ 13-15-1. Short title
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Business Opportunity Disclosure
Act. "

§ 13-15-2. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1)(a) "Assisted marketing plan" means the sale or lease of any products,
equipment, supplies, or services that are sold to the purchaser upon payment of an
initial required consideration of $300 or more for the purpose of enabling the
purchaser to start a business, and in which the seller represents:
(i) that the seller will provide locations or assist the purchaser in finding
locations for the use or operation of vending machines, racks, display cases,
or other similar devices, or currency operated amusement machines or devices,
on premises neither owned nor leased by the purchaser or seller;
(ii) that the seller will purchase any or all products made, produced,
fabricated, grown, or modified by the purchaser, using in whole or in part the
supplies, services, or chattels sold to the purchaser;
(iii) that the seller will provide the purchaser with a guarantee that the
purchaser will receive income from the assisted marketing plan that exceeds the
price paid for the assisted marketing plan, or repurchase any of the products,
equipment, supplies, or chattels supplied by the seller if the purchaser is
dissatisfied with the assisted marketing plan; or
(iv) that upon payment by the purchaser of a fee or sum of money, which exceeds
$300 to the seller, the seller will provide a sales program or marketing
program that will enable the purchaser to derive income from the assisted
marketing plan that exceeds the price paid for the marketing plan.
(b) "Assisted marketing plan" does not include:
(i) the sale of an ongoing business when the owner of that business sells and
intends to sell only that one assisted marketing plan;
(ii) not-for-profit sale of sales demonstration
samples for a total price of $300 or less; or

equipment,

materials,
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or
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( m ) the sale of a package franchise or a product franchise defined by and in
compliance with Federal Trade Commission rules governing franchise and business
opportunity ventures.
(c) As used in Subsection (1) (a) ( m )
"guarantee" means a written agreement,
signed by the purchaser and seller, disclosing the complete details and any
limitations or exceptions of the agreement.
(2) "Business
chapter.

opportunity"

(3) "Division"
Commerce.

means

the

means

Division

an

of

assisted

marketing

Consumer

Protection

plan

of

subject

the

to

this

Department

of

(4) (a) "Initial required consideration" means the total amount a purchaser is
obligated to pay under the terms of the assisted marketing plan, either prior to
or at the time of delivery of the products, equipment, supplies, or services, or
within six months of the commencement of operation of the assisted marketing plan
by the purchaser
If payment is over a period of time, "initial required
consideration" means the sum of the down payment and the total monthly payments
(b) "Initial required consideration" does not mean the not-for-profit sale of
sales demonstration equipment, materials, or supplies for a total price of less
than $300
(5) "Person" means any natural person, corporation,
association, trust, or any other legal entity.
(6) "Purchaser"
marketing plan.

means

a

person

who

becomes

partnership,

obligated

to

pay

for

organization,

an

assisted

(7) "Registered trademark" or "service mark" means a trademark, trade name, or
service mark registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or
Utah, or the state of incorporation if a corporation.
(8) "Seller" means a person who sells or offers to sell an assisted marketing plan.

§ 13-15-3. Administration and enforcement--Powers--Legal counsel--Fees
(1) The division shall administer and enforce this chapter. In the exercise of
its responsibilities, the division shall enjoy the powers, and be subject to the
constraints, set forth in Title 13, Chapter 2, Division of Consumer Protection
(2) The attorney general, upon request, shall give legal advice to, and act as
counsel for, the division in the exercise of its responsibilities under this
chapter
(3) All fees
Service Fund.

collected

under

this

chapter

shall

be

deposited

in
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Lesser
say okay, thatfs still not enough money and
just reject the deal?
A Because at that point that was the
highest price that somebody would pay for it.
Q. Was there some reason you had to
accept that price?
A No, other than we felt that it was
time to sell.
Q. And when you say "we felt it was
time to sell," who are you referring to,
Loeb?
A The board of directors of United
Park City Mines.
Q. What about Loeb?
A What about Loeb?
Q. They felt it was time to sell?
A As shareholders we solicited their
views and they were in favor of the sale,
just as we solicited the views of all the
shareholders and all the shareholders agreed
to the sale.
Q. Were the shareholders presented
with the alternative of just waiting for
another purchaser, or soliciting another

1
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Lesser
business with or if they are not financially
sound and they had to put out the wherewithal
to consummate the purchase.
Q. Have you ever discussed with Hank
Rothwell why he didn't immediately respond to
Mr. Sachs letter, his first letter stating
that he would expect a finder's fee and tell
him no, he wasn't going get afinder'sfee if
that was your position?
MS SCOTT: Objection. Assumes
facts not in evidence.
MR.WATKISS: It was quite vague
too, Kathy.
Q. Have you ever talked to
Mr. Rothwell about why he didn't upon
receiving Mr. Sachs first letter requesting a
finder's fee confirming that he would be
expecting that, write back to Mr. Sachs and
say no, you are not going do get a finder's
fee, we don't agree with that?
MS SCOTT: Same objection.
j
MR. WATKISS: Hard to follow.
A. I'm having difficulty.
Q. You've indicated that it was your
Page 129

Page 127

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
| 20
21
! 22
I 23
24
! 25

Lesser
1
purchaser?
2
A. I don't think any — I think that's
3
a determination usually of the board to
4
accept or reject an offer for the company,
5
and then they go out and get the consent of
6
the shareholders to that proposal. And the
7
consent was overwhelmingly in favor of taking 8
the $21 a share.
9
Q. Overwhelmingly, you mean —
10
A. I think it's a matter of record as
11
to what the vote was.
12
Q. This is in the absence of any
13
alternatives it was either the $21 a share or
14
nothing?
15
MR. WATKISS: Argumentative.
16
Q. Well, I mean, there weren't any
17
other purchasers around; isn't that true?
18
A. At that price, on that date the
19
answer is, yes. And incidentally, as I said
20
before, if there was another purchaser
21
around, all they had to do was to come in and 22
make an offer. It's a public company.
23
You've got to accept those offers unless the
24
people are people that you dont want to do
25

Lesser
position and Mr. Rothwell's position that
Mr. Sachs was not entitled to a finder's fee,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you're aware that Mr. Sachs
sent a fax to Mr. Rothwell indicating that if
this transaction goes through I'm going to
expect a modest finder's fee?
A. I believe you showed me a letter to
that effect.
Q. This letter on the 17th.
MS SCOTT: Aod by this transaction
you mean the transaction with Granite?
MS COLLARD: At tie time with
Granite.
A. I've already told you that if he
would have been responsible for Granite
purchasing and consummating the purchase,
since he came into see me at lunch with
Granite at that time it was a joint venture,
I think they really wanted a engineering
contract, be that as it may, if we would have
done a deal where Granite bought the company
and we would have recognize Mr. Sachs as the
33 (Pages 126 to 129)
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Lesser

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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broker in the transaction and he would have
been entitled to a fee.
Q. Wouldn't that have been true if he
brought in Mr. Jackson?
A. If he had brought in Mr. Jackson
and Mr. Jackson consummated the purchase ye;
that would be true, but as I understand it he
did not bring in Mr. Jackson.
Q. But that's based on whatever you
understand?
A. No, that's what I was told by
Mr. Rothwell and also by Mr. Jackson.
Q. Who did Mr. Jackson tell you
brought him in as a purchaser?
A. He said he had been having
discussions with Hank.
Q. And did you ever ask Mr. Jackson if
he told other people that Mr. Sachs was going
to get paid a finder's fee?
A. Since he already told me that he
wasn't entitled to one, why would I ask him
that question.
Q. Did Mr. Jackson tell you that
Mr. Sachs wasn't entitled to a finder's fee?

1
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Lesser
to one. You are not going to get paid a fee
from us, and would you please stop bothering
us.
Q. When is the last time you talked to
Mr. Jackson?
A. Last time I think was when he
signed the contract.
Q. When did he sign the contract?
A. In 2002,1 guess, something like
that.
Q. And you haven't spoken with him
since then?
A. I don't believe I have.
Q. Do you recall seeing Ira Sachs at
shareholder meetings?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. The annual meetings of United Park
City Mines?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. So you were aware that he was a
shareholder in the company?
A. No, I wasn't aware of that. I
assume that since he was there he owned
shares.
Page 133
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Lesser
1
A. He told him that, yes.
2
Q. What did he say about it?
3
A. He said he wasn't entitled to it.
4
That he was introduced to the company by Hank 5
Rothwell, who is the chief executive officer.
6
I think Jackson told me that personally or by
7
phone.
8
Q. When did he tell you that?
9
A. I don't remember.
10
Q. Was it after this lawsuit was
11
filed?
12
A. No, I think it was before the
13
lawsuit was filed, that's my recollection any
14
way.
15
Q. Well, when?
16
A. I don't remember.
17
Q. So you don't remember when it was
18
but you are sure that it was before the
19
lawsuit was filed?
20
A. Yes, I think so, because with all
21
the calls that everybody was getting from
22
Mr. Sachs, including calls to my office. And
23
frankly, then I got on the phone directly
24
with Ira and I said Ira, you are not entitled
25

Lesser
Q. Isn't it true that during your
lunch-in with Mr. Sachs you never told him
that Gerry Jackson was already engaged in a
deal with Mr. Rothwell or had talked to
Mr. Rothwell about purchasing the Park City
Mines?
A I don't recall everything that was
discussed, but I'm almost certain I never
said that.
Q. Do you recall?
A I don't recall.
Is it possible that you did say
that?
A It's possible* but I doubt it
Q. Did you ever meet Gerry Jackson
prior to the time that he made the offer for
the Park City Mines with his Capital Growth
people?
A I don't recall ever meeting him
before that.
Q. Or talking to him?
A Or talking to him other than I
think the conversation where we had I'm not
sure whether — conversation or it was a

a
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